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THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture was established in 1948 by the
family and friends of Tyrrell Williams, a distinguished member of the
faculty of the Washington University School of Law from 1913 to 1946.
Since its inception, the Lectureship has provided a forum for the discussion
of significant and often controversial issues currently before the legal com-
munity. Former Tyrrell Williams Lecturers include some of the nation's
foremost legal scholars, judges, public servants and practicing attorneys.
The Honorable William H. Webster, distinguished jurist, public servant
and attorney, delivered the 1985 Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture on
the Campus of Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, on March
14, 1985.
SOPHISTICATED SURVEILLANCE-
INTOLERABLE INTRUSION OR
PRUDENT PROTECTION?
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER*
A few days ago someone gave me the lapel button I hold in my hand.
It reads: "My job is so secret even I don't know what I'm doing."
* Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. Numerous times in his
career, Judge Webster has left private practice to serve the public interest. He served as United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri from 1960 until 1961. He was appointed a
Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in 1970, and elevated
in 1973 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. He resigned the Bench in 1978
to become Director of the FBI. Judge Webster is a graduate of Amherst College and the Washing-
ton University School of Law.
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There may be some rough correlation between that statement and how
we feel about secrecy. Secrecy conjures up images of Orwellian intrusion
by government, of clandestine activities that put at risk our most cher-
ished individual liberties, and of mistakes and blunders concealed within
documents classified "Secret" or "Eyes Only."
There is, of course, historical basis for all of these concerns, but that is
not my real purpose in speaking to you today. Rather, I propose to talk
about some of the measures we legitimately can employ in a free society
to protect ourselves from the ravages of crime, of terrorism, of betrayal
of the public trust.
Our basic liberties are identified and enshrined in our Constitution.
There must be no retreat from that. An awareness of and respect for the
law's demands is fundamental to all who are sworn to uphold the law.
But it is no defense of ordered liberty to deny to those whom we commis-
sion to enforce the laws the lawful tools that modern science and profes-
sional advancement have made possible. There is a balancing process
which each of us must share. We call it "justice" and it continues to be
the great interest of man on earth.'
When the FBI announces arrests in a major case such as a round-up of
outlaw motorcycle gang members, charges brought against the leaders of
organized crime, interdiction of a terrorist plot, the break-up of a huge
drug distribution network, or the revelation of major frauds against the
government or corruption in public office, there is usually a substantial
cheer from around the country that we have been able to serve and pro-
tect our fellow citizens. These investigations are frequently conducted in
secret over sustained periods of time, utilizing sophisticated and, at
times, intrusive techniques. It is my experience that these techniques
generally have been accepted as necessary and their use largely has been
supported. The key to acceptance lies in preestablished rules of conduct
and ultimate public accountability for the faithful adherence to such
rules.
When these factors are absent, what we do may be seen as intolerable
intrusion. When they are present, our work is most likely to be viewed as
it was intended to be-prudent protection for our fellow citizens.
Through the years a healthy public skepticism has helped to keep
those of us in law enforcement mindful of the ultimate source of our
1. Daniel Webster quoted in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 624 (WILLIAM W.
STORY, ed., 1851).
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authority. Trust is something to be earned by performance and main-
tained by periodic public accountability.
Thus far, I have painted with a broad brush some thoughts in which I
sincerely believe. I will now refine the strokes a bit and focus on some
critical areas where these principles find application in modern, sophisti-
cated law enforcement.
I propose now to discuss some sensitive investigative techniques that
we use currently-the informant, electronic surveillance and the under-
cover agent.
These techniques help us to reach beyond the individual street crimi-
nal to the upper echelons of criminal enterprises, to those who are calling
the signals, making the profits and who are really responsible for the
heavy impact of crime in our society. These tools help us obtain infor-
mation that traditional investigative techniques-the interview, the phys-
ical surveillance and the crime scene inspection-simply will not
produce.
The use of informants, electronic surveillance and undercover agents
has become very sophisticated. Some say their use is merely prudent
protection for society. Others argue that it is an intolerable intrusion
into our private lives. But maintaining law and order in society often
requires a certain amount of intrusion. In a typical investigation, our
agents will talk to people, look into records and examine forensic evi-
dence. These activities are, to a lesser degree, intrusive.
Most of us willingly accept some degree of intrusion to ensure public
safety. For example, some years ago while sitting on the Eighth Circuit,
I wrote an opinion touching upon the use of inspection points for passen-
gers boarding aircraft. It was my opinion then that the additional mea-
sure of safety provided to passengers in ffight more than offset the
minimal intrusion involved in that situation.2 Experience has reinforced
that view and, as I said then, I believe the public would be outraged if
these checks suddenly were removed from airport terminals.
But the use of sensitive techniques in federal investigations has raised
some important issues-particularly questions about fairness. I remem-
ber reading an article that appeared a number of years ago in the Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal entitled "Lincoln and the Law" by the noted
legal scholar Arthur L. Goodhart, who delivered the Tyrrell Williams
Lecture in 1964. Dr. Goodhart made an important observation about
2. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 45 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Lincoln's legal philosophy. He said, "[T]o Lincoln the most important
idea that the law represented was the idea of fairness. Justice carries a
pair of scales that are evenly balanced."' 3 Maintaining that sense of fair-
ness is as important today as it was in Lincoln's time. So, I shall tell you
how we manage these sensitive techniques to keep the scales in balance.
The informant is the single most important tool in law enforcement.
Every police officer knows that if a bank robbery is not solved within
forty-eight hours, it is not going to be solved, in all likelihood, until an
informant is located who has some information about the robbery and is
willing to share it. After all the forensic evidence is in, after all the eye-
witnesses have been interviewed, if the police cannot find or identify the
bank robber, it is going to depend on someone who has information
either before or after the fact. This is true in most investigations, but is
especially true of the more elusive, insu!ated and often consensual crimi-
nal activity that is associated with organized crime and white-collar
crime.
There are many kinds of informants. On one end of the spectrum is
the professional criminal informant who is paid for information, prom-
ised confidentiality, and not required to testify. He is simply giving us
information that helps build prosecutable cases. At the other end of the
spectrum is the good citizen who gives us information out of a laudable
sense of duty. He may want his identity kept confidential. If he agrees to
play a more important role in the investigation, we call him a cooperat-
ing witness because he ultimately may testify in court. In ongoing inves-
tigations his immediate role may be to feign collusion with the criminal
element, to observe and gather evidence, or to introduce our undercover
agents to those running the criminal enterprise.
An informant may be someone deeply involved in crime, such as
Jimmy Fratianno. Fratianno was a vicious criminal and an admitted
mob hit man. He had become a very important organized crime figure.
But he was in serious trouble: someone had put out a contract on him.
So he came to us. Because of his long-time criminal ties, Fratianno re-
vealed some very valuable information on the structure, interrelation-
ships and activities of organized crime groups. His testimony resulted in
the convictions of the entire ruling hierarchy of the Los Angeles organ-
ized crime family.
A cooperating witness may be someone with an unblemished reputa-
3. Goodhart, Lincoln and the Law, 50 A.B.A. J. 422, 441 (May 1964).
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tion for honesty and fairness such as Judge Brockton Lockwood. Judge
Lockwood, an associate judge from southern Illinois, was serving as a
visiting judge in Cook County. He came to the FBI after he became
aware of the long-known but unproved corruption in the Cook County
court system. I met with him and he eventually agreed to pose as a dis-
honest judge, hiding a tape recorder in his cowboy boots. Cultivating an
image as an "ignorant hillbilly," Judge Lockwood gathered information
that has been crucial in our GREYLORD investigation. In a newspaper
interview, Judge Lockwood explained why he decided to report the judi-
cial corruption: "I tried to avoid it. But my conscience just wouldn't let
me."'4 I wish more people shared that sense of responsibility.
Jimmy Fratianno and Brockton Lockwood are at different ends of the
informant spectrum. Yet they both provided important information on
criminal activity. Our main concern in selecting informants is not their
lovability, but their reliability.
At the same time, once an ongoing relationship with an informant has
been established, fairness to the public as a whole requires us to do an
increasingly better job of managing the informant. Criminal informants
are capable of working both sides of the street. They need supervision.
That is why we keep extensive records on our dealings with them. I have
thought for a long time that the so-called "hip-pocket informant," an
informant on whom the police officer keeps no record, is an occasion for
mischief. We require that absolutely meticulous records be kept on our
informants. Their confidentiality is protected, but we know, and our files
reflect, what they have done, what they have been instructed to do, what
they have been paid and what they have produced. Those records are
carefully safeguarded, but they exist to discharge our responsibility to
account for the activities of a particular informant.
In assessing the suitability of an informant, we are interested in such
things as his productiveness, his personal involvement in crime, the like-
lihood of his engaging in violent behavior, the reasons he is willing to
cooperate with us and, most importantly, his willingness to follow in-
structions. We must be sure that our informant is not taking advantage
of his relationship with us to engage in frolics of his own, or worse, to
become an agent provocateur. With careful supervision we can direct
him in paths most likely to lead to a successful investigation that will
withstand the closest judicial scrutiny.
4. "Hillbilly' Judge Stars in Chicago Courtroom Sting, The L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1983 at 1.
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We function under Attorney General guidelines and FBI regulations
that spell out specific responsibilities for use of informants, a vitally im-
portant tool. The agent controlling an informant is required to report to
his supervisor any criminal activity of the informant that comes to his
attention. Some minor illegal activity may be allowed to continue in the
interest of getting information that will permit us to reach a much more
significant and perhaps more dangerous criminal. This exception, how-
ever, does not extend to violence. We will not permit our informants to
participate in violent crime. If such plans come to our attention, the
informant will be instructed to dissuade the conspirators. If this fails, we
will take steps to circumvent the violence. The informant understands
that if he violates these instructions, he will be prosecuted.
We have learned that when confronted by overwhelming evidence of
defendants engaged in wrongdoing, an increasingly popular defense strat-
egy is to attack the means by which the evidence was acquired, to deni-
grate the government agents personally, and to play on jurors' innate
sense of fairness. Unless the government witness has been prepared for
such an assault, the slightest hesitancy or confusion can be made to sug-
gest deviousness of purpose. The focus then shifts away from the defend-
ant's own acts of wrongdoing. When, for example, an undercover agent
participates in a scenario such as a contrived business dealing with
criminals, the agent on cross-examination may be pressed to admit that
he "lied" about his work. While deception is a legally sanctioned tool in
law enforcement, 5 in skillful legal hands it may be inaccurately charac-
terized as, if not entrapment, then somehow "unfair."
It therefore is the task of the prosecution to demonstrate both the ne-
cessity and the fairness of the procedures the government has employed.
Perhaps nowhere does this fairness factor come to the surface in a jury
trial more visibly and more critically than when the government asks the
jury to accept the testimony of a cooperating witness with a tainted rec-
ord over the word of a defendant who has no record of prior convictions.
Juries rightfully demand corroboration of the testimony of such a witness
whom they have no reason to trust. Our natural aversion to "snitches,"
to criminals trying to buy their own way out of trouble with their testi-
mony against others, requires a higher level of persuasion before such
witnesses will be believed.
5. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
441-42 (1932).
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The lessons we have learned from the fairness factor at trial are these:
(1) use the tainted witness as sparingly as possible in an undercover in-
vestigation and move him into the background as soon as he has vouched
for our undercover special agents; (2) employ the electronic and video
coverage to obtain confirmation from the defendant himself of what the
cooperating witness will eventually say from the witness stand; and
(3) rely more upon our own special agents to make the case at trial. The
tainted witness' pretrial conduct must be able to withstand the most
searching cross-examination, and their testimony must be so forthright
that no jury can read into it any form of dissembling or equivocation.
Under such circumstances juries will convict and their subliminal need
for fairness will have been satisfied.
Where feasible, we use informants and our other traditional techniques
to obtain the evidence we need on criminal activities. But sometimes
these less intrusive methods will not do the job. Then when, we have
probable cause to believe that criminal conversations can be intercepted
in this manner, we may turn to electronic surveillance. The Title III
provisions of the Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Act of 1968 authorize
and regulate this vitally important investigative tool, referred to as the
Title III wiretap. These wiretaps are particularly effective in dealing
with members of organized criminal enterprises who are often too wary
to meet, but who must communicate in order to be effective.
In every instance when we use a Title III wiretap, a federal judge has
authorized it upon a showing of probable cause. We distinguish Title III
wiretaps from consensual monitoring wiretaps, which we use to listen to
a conversation between a criminal and someone working for us.
Although we are listening to that conversation, the courts have held
there is no expectation of privacy because the person with whom the
criminal is talking has consented that we overhear. But even then we
listen pursuant to certain approved rules, so that it is not a promiscuous
operation.6
One example will show our level of concern about keeping our agents
advised of what they can and cannot do with respect to electronic sur-
veillance. Shortly after I became director of the FBI, there was a Sixth
Circuit opinion holding that notwithstanding the Title III wiretap statute
6. The same rules apply whether the device used to overhear conversations is a telephone or a
microphone. Whatever the device, the key factor in distinguishing a consensual monitoring inter-
ception from a Title III interception is the consent of one person privy to the intercepted
conversation.
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authorizing us to install a microphone in a given place upon a showing of
probable cause, courts do not have the authority to permit us to make a
surreptitious entry to put the microphone in place.7 That left us in the
position of ringing the doorbell and saying, "Sir, may we put a
microphone in your living room?" Obviously, we believed that opinion
was clearly and seriously wrong. But the first thing we did was send a
teletype to all of our field offices within the Sixth Circuit advising them of
the opinion and instructing them to immediately discontinue any
microphone wiretaps installed by surreptitious entry.
Not long after that, the Ninth Circuit came down with a parallel rul-
ing, 8 and we immediately did the same thing in the Ninth Circuit. Fortu-
nately for us, a similar case was working its way up through the Third
Circuit. The Supreme Court heard that case and held that inherent in
the authority to put a microphone in place is the authorization to make a
surreptitious entry to do so. The Court said it was not even necessary for
the authorizing court to spell that out in its order.9
But again, out of an abundance of caution and concern for fairness, I
instructed the field that we would advise the court of every instance in
which we intended to make a surreptitious entry and ask the court to
include the authority to do so in the order. In that way, the judge would
know beyond question what he was approving. Occasionally, we have a
judge say, "Why do you require this? The Supreme Court doesn't de-
mand that." We require it because we want to be sure that the judge
knows exactly what we propose to do.
A court order for a wiretap will not be granted just because we ask for
it. We must convince a federal judge that there is probable cause to be-
lieve a particular crime is being committed or is about to be committed,
that a particular individual is'involved in criminal activity, that a certain
phone or house will be used and that certain conversations will likely
occur on a particular phone. We have to tell the federal judge how many
times we have tapped a phone so he can decide if we are on a fishing
expedition and should be barred from further intruding on that person's
privacy.
But even before the application for a Title III wiretap goes to the re-
viewing judge, it comes to FBI headquarters where my special assistants
7. United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929 (1979).
8. United States v. Santora, 583 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 939 (1979).
9. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), aftg, United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d
Cir. 1978).
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and I scrutinize it carefully. These special assistants are selected for out-
standing law school and clerking performance. They serve in an advi-
sory capacity for two years before going on to promising legal careers. I
have found they bring a fresh new dimension to our deliberations. If
they find the application in order, and I concur, then I will approve it.
Finally, the application goes to the attorney general or his designee for
review.
An important element of the application is the description of the mini-
mization procedures we will use to prevent our accumulating non-crimi-
nal and privileged information. These procedures include turning off the
wiretap when there is a conversation taking place that is unrelated to the
crime or where attorney-client privilege might be involved. When we are
tapping a public phone booth, we make every effort to watch the booth so
that we intercept conversations only when the suspect is using the phone.
This precaution protects the public from indiscriminate listening and en-
sures fairness.
While we have directed most of our court-ordered electronic surveil-
lance at organized crime and narcotics trafficking, we are also using this
technique to investigate terrorist groups and espionage activities.
In our Chicago investigation of the FALN, a Puerto Rican terrorist
group, we used closed-circuit television cameras to effectively gather in-
formation on the terrorists' bomb making. We watched them assemble
the ammunition and make the bombs. This group was responsible for a
number of serious bombings and armed robberies and our investigation
revealed they were planning even more violence. Based on our TV moni-
toring and other evidence, we arrested four terrorists. During the pre-
trial phase of this case, the district court suppressed the videotapes on the
ground that there was no statutory or other basis for the judge's granting
an order pursuant to Title III for the use of closed-circuit TV cameras.10
10. While Title III does not expressly authorize the use of closed-circuit television surveillance,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 does. This act, known as FISA, created the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court, composed of seven federal district judges who must approve
electronic surveillances that monitor conversations of people suspected of espionage or terrorism in
the United States. The Act covers four categories of electronic surveillance: (1) wiretaps; (2) radio
intercepts; (3) monitoring devices, such as microphones, closed-circuit television, transmitters that
track vehicle movement, and other techniques; and (4) watch listing-acquiring wire or radio com-
munications of a particular individual. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978: The First Five Years, S. Doc. No. 660, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1984).
Proposals for electronic surveillance under FISA receive a thorough review beginning with an FBI
Headquarters supervisor. We want to be sure that our use of this technique is absolutely necessary.
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The Department of Justice appealed that ruling and, just recently, the
Seventh Circuit reversed it. Judge Richard Posner distilled the law down
to this one crisp conclusion: "There is no right to be let alone while
assembling bombs in safe houses."11
The third of these very sensitive techniques is the undercover agent.
He has been glamorized or criticized, depending upon one's perspective,
primarily as a result of the enormous publicity accompanying the AB-
SCAM cases. 2 But the undercover agent is not a panacea for law en-
forcement. He is a valuable weapon, especially effective in investigations
involving consensual crime when we do not have a willing witness. This
is true in prostitution, gambling, drugs and bribery, where there are will-
ing participants on each side. The transactions are not taking place in
the middle of Main Street so there are no witnesses. Courts have fully
sanctioned, and congressional reports have encouraged, properly man-
aged use of undercover agents.
To attack major criminal enterprises, we need staying power. We had
long used informants to provide leads and occasionally function as coop-
erating witnesses acting out a predesigned scenario. But we found that
Again, my special assistants and I evaluate the proposal. Once I approve it, I send it to the Justice
Department for approval by the Attorney General. Finally, the application is reviewed by the FISA
court.
One important purpose served by all of these steps is to ensure that we do not direct electronic
surveillance against people because of lawful political activities protected by the Constitution. We
want to be confident that when we approve a FISA application, as well as any proposal for use of
electronic surveillance techniques, we are using these tools in not only a legal, but an appropriate
manner.
11. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1984).
12. United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 243 (1984); United
States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1984);petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 1171 (U.S. Jan.
19, 1985) (No. 84-1171); United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
961 (1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983);
United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1285 (1984); United
States v. Silvestri, 719 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 835 (1982); United States v. Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108
(1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); United
States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983); Hughes v. United
States, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir.), aff'g, 534 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Criden, 633
F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Murphy, 642 F.2d 699
(2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980);
United States v. Jenrette, 594 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 744 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Hughes v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ill.), af'd, 701 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
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the informant, often with a criminal background, was sometimes not suf-
ficiently disciplined or trustworthy to carry out the demanding responsi-
bilities required by an investigation. Often they had to be entrusted with
large sums of money. In addition, there was the problem of establishing,
for a jury, the credibility of someone who had made a deal with the gov-
ernment in return for his cooperation and testimony.
On the other hand, we believe our special agents are more trustworthy,
more disciplined, and more sensitive to individual rights. We train them
to understand and respect the law's requirements. The bottom line for
successful undercover work is control, discipline and staying power-the
ability to remain in the operation until all the evidence has been devel-
oped. We use the informant or cooperating witness to vouch for the un-
dercover agent and give us an entry. But as soon as possible, we ease the
cooperating witness out of the picture, using him less and less and our
agent more and more.
Although we currently budget less than one percent of our field re-
sources to undercover work and use undercover agents only when tradi-
tional methods have been unsuccessful, they are extraordinarily cost-
effective. During fiscal year 1984, investigations using this technique
produced nearly 1,200 arrests, almost 1,000 convictions, more than $100
million in recoveries and fines of almost $3 million.
A recent Miami case is a good example of how these undercover oper-
ations frequently develop. In that case, a cooperating witness came to us
after some people interested in overthrowing the Honduran government
approached him to hire a hit man to assassinate President Roberto
Suazo. We arranged for the cooperating witness to introduce an under-
cover agent to the group. The plotters struck a deal with our agent and
agreed to pay him $300,000 for the assassination.
During our investigation, we found out that some members of the
group were also involved in drug trafficking and they invited our under-
cover agent into a previously arranged drug deal. We brought down the
operation by arresting eight of the plotters. We have requested extradi-
tion of the ninth conspirator, a general assigned to the Honduran em-
bassy in Santiago, Chile. In addition to preventing the assassination of
President Suazo, we seized a twin-engine airplane, two small jet air-
planes, a 158-foot freighter converted to carry marijuana, and 345 kilos
of cocaine valued at more than 10 million dollars.
The length, complexity and sensitive nature of undercover projects call
for very careful planning and control. The review process originates in
Number 3]
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the field when we try different ways of getting at a crime problem. We
know the problem is there, but sometimes we can not develop sufficient
admissible evidence. Our field office managers develop a scenario to use
an undercover agent. The special agent in charge of the field office and
the local United States Attorney's office review and approve the scenario.
The proposal is then submitted to headquarters where it is reviewed by
what we call the "substantive desk," the particular program management
area for that specific crime.
If the proposal fails to survive this scrutiny, it goes back for reform or
is rejected outright. If it passes the substantive desk, it is reviewed by our
Undercover and Special Operations Unit, which is concerned with the
payment of money, the utilization of equipment and other things unique
to undercover work. And then it goes on to our most important institu-
tional group, which I established in late 1978, the Criminal Undercover
Operations Review Committee. This committee consists of representa-
tives of key divisions within headquarters-again, those who have to pay
the money, develop the sensitive technical equipment and bear personal
responsibility for the investigations. The committee also includes repre-
sentatives from the Legal Counsel Division, one of my special assistants
and four representatives from the Department of Justice. This group re-
views the proposal in terms of its legality, practicality and appropriate-
ness. I review the minutes of the committee's deliberations to monitor
their actions. If the committee approves of the proposal, they make a
recommendation to the head of our Criminal Investigative Division, or in
particularly sensitive circumstances, to me. No operation is approved for
more than six months and extensions are granted only after committee
review. 13
Legal issues are very carefully considered. The issue of entrapment
comes up in every undercover case. It will be a defense argued at the
beginning; it will be a defense argued at trial; it will be a defense argued
13. Occasionally, the committee will reject a proposal or require the submitting field office to
redesign it because of some flaw. For example, a field office recently made a proposal to investigate
"chop shops"-auto wrecking yards handling stolen auto parts. The proposal involved an under-
cover operation in which our agents would set up a chop shop and then contact thieves to obtain the
parts requested by body shops.
When the committee reviewed this proposal, we found some significant problems. Our first con-
cern was the risk of civil liability and loss to an innocent party if our request for parts resulted in the
theft of someone's vehicle. Our second worry was that personal property left in a stolen vehicle
would be kept or sold by the thieves. Finally, we were concerned that someone would be injured or
perhaps killed during an auto theft. Because of these concerns, the committee would not approve
the proposal in this form.
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on appeal. I can think of only one case in my seven years when such a
defense may have prevailed.
We have an equal concern for possible harm to third parties. Some-
times, in spite of our best efforts to avoid it, third parties have sustained
losses. We are working with the Department of Justice on some legisla-
tive proposals that will provide financial protection for innocent people
who may have been harmed unintentionally by our undercover opera-
tions. But that legislation will not mean relaxed vigilance on our part.
We will continue to weed out those proposals that run excessive risk of
injuring innocent parties.
Once in place, we monitor undercover operations closely to ensure
compliance with the Attorney General's legal requirements and guide-
lines. For example, federal prosecutors in New York and Justice Depart-
ment attorneys in Washington reviewed the ABSCAM case on a daily
basis and made recommendations on numerous investigative steps. Pros-
ecutors personally monitored, on closed-circuit television, many of the
transactions as they took place. One purpose for this on-line monitoring
was to guard against conduct amounting to entrapment. The attorneys
could pick up a telephone and call into the meeting room. The under-
cover agent would answer as if he was receiving a business call and ob-
tain instructions necessary to ensure that we were following all legal
requirements. 14 The procedures worked well, as we were successful in
every appeal taken in the ABSCAM cases.
We cannot anticipate and avoid every conceivable problem in a scena-
rio in which only some of the players have the script, but we make every
effort to do so and to build upon our past experience. That is the purpose
of the Review Committee: to build institutional awareness.
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson once observed that the Consti-
14. The conclusion of an undercover operation signals the beginning of the final phase of fair-
ness evaluation. This retrospective assessment starts in the courts, where judges or juries must ulti-
mately rule on the defense of entrapment or denial of due process. We are keen observers of this
evaluation phase, for it is here that we find out how successful we have been in trying to ensure
fairness. If the court finds that our agents induced an otherwise innocent individual to commit a
crime, we will carefully reexamine the case to find where our controls broke down. And in future
investigations involving similar scenarios, we will take additional steps to guarantee the standard of
fairness. This retrospective assessment does not stop with the trial courts or even with the appellate
courts. It may include a review of our entire undercover program by congressional committees and
subcommittees. For example, the ABSCAM cases resulted in considerable congressional review.
We welcome these reexaminations by Congress because we know that ultimately we must answer to
the American people.
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tutional Bill of Rights of the United States was not a suicide pact. 5 The
protections it includes and affords to us must be rationally applied if we
are to prevail against those in our midst who daily frustrate through vio-
lence and lawlessness the liberties our Constitution was designed to se-
cure. To this degree the police power of the state is allowed to function
through lawful, if occasionally intrusive, techniques; through statutes,
guidelines, rules and regulations appropriately adopted; through law en-
forcement officers trained to know and respect these requirements;
through executive, legislative and judicial oversight of the process; and
through ultimate public accountability. To this degree our modem in-
vestigative weapons can protect us from the power and viciousness of
otherwise unchecked criminality. Unless the technique is illegal per se or
so contrary to public policy as to be unworthy of use, we should rely
upon appropriate management of the technique to serve the ends of jus-
tice rather than lose its great value for fear of its possible abuse.
In the FBI, these safeguards are in place. We realize that the law en-
forcement officer is the port of entry to the criminal justice system. If we
fail in our duty to be both effective and fair, no prosecutor or judge can
save the case, so we must not fail. We must preserve both the appearance
and reality of fairness that Lincoln thought was the most important as-
pect of our legal system.
This is what the American people expect of us; this is what the Consti-
tution demands of us.
15. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
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